Item No.10      Court No.7      041281     Section XIV

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS

PETITION FOR SPECIAL LEAVE TO APPEAL (CIVIL)
Nos. 6469 and 9396 of 1980 A/N
(From the judgement and order dated 2-4-80 of the High Court of Delhi at New Delhi)

In L:P:A. No. 59/75

Municipal Corpn. of Delhi ....……PETITIONER(S)

VERSUS

Ram Kumar Bhardwaj & Ors. etc. (with appln for stay) …….RESPONDENT(S)

Date : 22-4-83. This petition was called on for hearing today.

CORAM: 
Hon'ble Mr. Justice A. P. Sen
Hon'ble Mr. Justice E. S. Venkatramiah

FOR THE PETITIONER(S):
Mr. L. N. Sinha, A. G. Mr. Subhash Bhatt &
Mr. B. P. Maheshwari, Advs.

FOR THE RESPONDENT(S):
Mr. S. L. Bhatia, Sr. Adv. Mr. B. R. Aggarwal and
Mr. K. S. Rohtagi, Advs.

Upon hearing counsel the Court made the following

ORDER

Special Leave Petitions are dismissed

Sd/-
Court Master

Item No. 3      Court No. 6      Section XIV

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS

Petition(s) for Special Leave to appeal (Civil/No.(s) 6612 of 1983
(From the Judgement and order date 24.11.82 of the High Court of Delhi at New Delhi in LPA No.142/82)

Om Prakash Mittal ...............PETITIONER(S)

VERSUS

Council of Architecture & Anr. ................RESPONDENT(S)

Date : 12.3.90 : This/These petition(s) was/were called on for hearing today

CORAM :
Hon'ble Mr. Justice K. Jagannatha Shetty
Hon'ble Mr. Justice S.C. Agrawal
Hon'ble Mr. Justice

FOR THE PETITIONER(S):
Mr. Wazir Singh and Mr. Mukul Gupta, Advs.

FOR THE RESPONDENT(S):
Mr. K.R. Nagaraja, Adv. (NP)

Upon hearing counsel the Court made the following

ORDER

Special Leave Petition is dismissed.

Sd/-                   Sd/-
Seema               V.K. Minocha
Court Master     Court Master

Seal Supreme Court of India

237489

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS

Petition(s) for Special Leave to appeal (Civil/No.(s) 12110 of 1983
(From the Judgement and order date 6.1.1983 of the High Court of Delhi at New Delhi in LPA No.146/1983)

Kastuba Nand Pandey                                               ...............PETITIONER(S)

       VERSUS

Council of Architecture & Anr.                                ................RESPONDENT(S)
(With appln. for condn. of delay)

Date : 26.4.90 : This/These petition(s) was/were called on for hearing today

CORAM :
Hon'ble Mr. Justice M.M. Punchhi
Hon'ble Mr. Justice R.M. Sahai
Hon'ble Mr. Justice

FOR THE PETITIONER(S):   Mr. K.K. Venugopal, Sr. Adv.
                                                Mr. N.K. Aggarwal, Adv.

FOR THE RESPONDENT(S): Mr. K.R. Nagaraja, Adv. (NP)

Upon hearing counsel the Court made the following

ORDER

Delay not condoned. Consequently Special Leave Petition is dismissed.

           Sd/-                                                                                                           Sd/-
         Seema                                                                                                      V.K. Minocha
    Court Master                                                                                                  Court Master

Seal Supreme Court of India

237489

Item No. 30                                                       Court No. 4                                                            Section IX

A/N MATTER

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS

Petition(s) for Special Leave to appeal (Civil/No. 18082 of 2000
(From the Judgement and order dated 20/06/2000 in SCA 1111/99 of the High Court of Gujarat at Ahmedabad)

Chairman, Gujarat Housing Board           ...............PETITIONER(S)

VERSUS

Girish Mistry & Ors.                                ................RESPONDENT(S)
                                                          (With prayer for interim relief)

Date : 17.09.2001 This Petition was called on for hearing today.

CORAM:   Hon'ble Mr. Justice G.B. Patnaik
                Hon'ble Mrs. Justice Ruma Pal

FOR THE PETITIONER(S):   Mr. S.C. Patel, Adv.
                                          Mr. N.K. Aggarwal, Adv.

FOR THE RESPONDENT(S): Mr. V.N. Raghhupathy, Adv.
                                           Ms. Vijaya Lakshmi Menon, Adv.
                                           Mr. H.A. Raichura, Adv.

Upon hearing counsel the Court made the following

ORDER

The counsel for the petitioner seeks permission to withdarw this petition. The prayer for withdrawl is allowed. But,the respondents having entered appearance are entitled to cost, which is fixed at 5,000/-.                                                

This amount will be equally divided amongst and paid to Respondent Nos. 1, 3, 5, 6 and 7 by the petitioner, within four weeks from today.

The Special Leave Petition stands dismissed as withdrawn.

           Sd/-                                                                                                           Sd/-
     (J.S. Rawat)                                                                                                  (Suneet Bala Sharma)
    Court Master                                                                                                  Court Master

SEAL
Supreme Court of India

19/09/2001                              

IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
L.P.A. No.59 of 1975

1. Municipal Corporation of Delhi, through the Commissioner, Town Hall, Delhi.
   
   
2. The Commissioner the Municipal Corporation of Delhi, Town Hall, Delhi.
   
   
3. The Executive Engineer (Bld), Building Department (HQ), Town Hall, Delhi. ……PETITIONERS

VERSUS

1. Shri Ram Kumar Bhardwaj, S/o. Shri Ram Chandra Sharma, 25/149 Shaktinagar, Delhi-7
   
   
2. Shri Kasturi Lal, S/o. Shri Panju Ram, 76-A, East Azad Nagar, Shahdara Delhi.
   
   
3. Shri Miri Lal Sanoriya, S/o. Shri Nanak Chand Sanoriya, 2/44 Roop Nagar, Delhi-7
   
   
4. Shri R.G. Sanoria, S/o Shri Niader Mal Sanoria, 243, Ajmeri Gate, Delhi-6
   
   
5. Shri C.L. Ghai, S/o. Jiwand Lal, 1/32 B, Poorvi Marg, New Delhi-6.
   
   
6. Shri Radha Lal Saxena, S/o. Shri Brij Basi Lal Saxena, C-1/444, S.J.D.A., New Delhi.7
   
   
7. Shri Chanan Ram Sharma, S/o. Sh. Manak Chand Sharma. 4/60, Roop Nagar, Delhi-7.
   
   
8. Shri P.S. Jain, S/o. Sh. Bansari Das Jain, 2153, Gali Hanuman Pershad, Masjid Khajoor, Delhi-6. …….RESPONDENTS

LETTERS PATENT UNDER X OF THE LETTERS PATENT AGAINST THE JUDGEMENT DATED 23.5.1975 BY HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE S. RANGARAJAN IN C.W.P. NO. 509/75 and 515/75.

This the 2nd day of April, 1980.

CORAM:
HON'BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE B.N. KIRPAL.

FOR THE PETITIONER:
SHRI MAHARAJ KISWAN WITH SHRI P.R MONGA, ADVOCATE.

FOR THE RESPONDENT:
SHRI D.D CHAWLA, SR. ADVOCATE WITH SHRI C.L CHAUDHERY, ADVOCATE

ORDER

V.S. DESHPANDE C.J. (ORAL):

The respondents are registered as architects under the Architects Act, 1972 and practice as such in the Union Territory of Delhi. They filed two writ petitions : challenging the power of the Delhi Municipal Corporation to impose restrictions on their right to practice as architects. The restrictions and the basis on which the restriction was imposed may be described as below :-

Section 2 (25) of the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957 (the Act) is as below:

"Licensed architect" 'licensed draughtsman' 'licensed engineer, 'licensed plumber, `licensed surveyor' and 'licensed town planner' mean respectively a person licensed under the provisions of this act as an architect, draughtsman, engineer, plumber, surveyor and town planner." .

Since the definition of section 2(25) contemplates that a licensed architect or a licensed draughtsman, it is necessary to know the provisions which empower the Corporation to license an architect or a draughtsman under the Act. Section 430 (1) of the Act states that whenever it is provided in this Act or any bye-law made there under that a license or a "written permission may be granted for any purpose, such license or a written permission shall be signed by the Commissioner or by the officer empowered to grant the same under this Act or the bye laws made there under". There is no specific provision in the Act itself empowering the Corporation to issue license to an architect or a draughtsman. Section 481 (1) of the Act empowered the Corporation to make bye- laws for various matters. Part F thereof empowers the making of bye-laws relating to buildings. Part L thereof empowers the making of bye-laws relating to miscellaneous matters. Clause 97 of Part L is .as follows :-

"(7) Any other matter which is to be or may be prescribed by bye-laws made under this Act or in respect of which this Act makes no provisions or makes insufficient provision and provision is, in the opinion of the Corporation, necessary for the efficient municipal government of Delhi."

This is a residuary power to make bye-laws given to the Corporation, if the making of such bye-laws is necessary "for the efficient municipal government of Delhi".

Whatever may have been the position before the coming into force of the Architects Act, 1972, what we have to consider is whether after the coming into force of the said Act the Delhi Municipal Corporation has any power to regulate the practice of architects by the insistence that they must possess a license issued by the Corporation. The Architects Act, 1972 sets out the qualification to be possessed by the persons to be registered as architects under the said Act. It also prohibits persons who do not have such registration from describing themselves as architects and also deals with disciplinary action for misconduct of architects. It is, therefore, a complete enactment the effect of which is that a person cannot call himself an architect unless he is registered under the said Act. Of course, unlike the Advocates Act, which restricts there under, the Architects Act does not restrict the practice by architects to persons registered under the said Act. Therefore, some persons who cannot call themselves architects may still be free to do the work which is ordinarily done by architects and they are not dealt with by the Architects Act, whether the Corporation can deal with such persons is not a question which arises before us. Our considerations is limited to the question whether the corporation can regulate the profession and practice of architects registered under the Architects Act, 1972 by insisting that the architects practicing in Delhi and submitting plans for construction of buildings for the approval of the corporation must possess licenses issued by the Corporation.

The provisions in the Act on which such authority could be claimed by the corporation have been discussed above and it has been found that there is no specific provision in the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act itself authorising the corporation to issues licenses to architects. We have, therefore, to seek for such provisions in the bye-laws, 69 bye-laws 6, 9 and 10(2) of the Building Bye-laws, 1959 refer to the licensed architects as being persons who can submit building plans. In view of the definition of "licensed architects" in section 2(25) the licensed architects referred to in the bye-laws have to be persons who are licensed under the provisions of the Act. The result is that on a consideration of these bye-laws the Commissioner, Delhi Municipal Corporation, issued the letter, dated 7th May, 1974 which is Annexure A to writ petition. In this letter it was proposed that the corporation may frame bye-laws for licensing and registration, inter alia, of draughtsman and architects as required by virtue of powers under 2(25) read with sections 430 and 431 of the Act, and Bye-laws 6 and 9 of the Building bye-laws, 1959. In the bye-laws proposed in this letter, provision is sought to be made to prescribe qualifications to be held by architects and draughtsman before licenses could be issued to them, for payment of license fees, deposit of security amounts by them and certain penalties to be imposed on them for contravention of these bye-laws. The whole scheme of such regulation was challenged by the respondents.

The writ petitions of the respondents are allowed by the learned Single Judge. who granted reliefs prayed for, namely to declare that this regulatory scheme was contrary to the Architects Act, 1972 and superseded by the said Act and, therefore, the purported action of the Corporation was ultra vires the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957. The resolution No.690, dated 3.9.1974, and the orders dated 2.4.1975 and 15.4.1975 were also apparently quashed by, allowing the writ petitions as a whole. These appeals have been preferred by the Corporation against the said decisions of learned Single Judge.

Two considerations are relevant to determine the authority of the Corporation to regulate the practice of the architects in submitting building plans to the Corporation for approval. Firstly, whether the Act and bye-laws framed validly there under authorise the Corporation to do so, and secondly, what is the effect on the authority of the Corporation, if any, of the passing of Architects Act, 1972.

CONSIDERATION NO.1

Presumably, section 2(25) of the Act contemplated issue of licenses to architects and draughtsman because at the time the Act was framed and enacted there was no Act providing for the registration of architects and issuing of registration certificates to them and thus regulating the profession and practice of Architects. Further, there may be other persons who cannot be registered as architects under the Architects Act, 1972 and in respect of such persons it is arguable that the Corporation had to make some provision because the building plans submitted to the Corporation have to be by persons who are qualified to the satisfaction of the Corporation. It is necessary for the Corporation to ensure that building plans are made by qualified persons and since the Corporation authorities cannot be expected to scrutinise the building plans with a view to redrafting them in each and every case, some preliminary safeguard that the plans have been prepared by qualified persons could be insisted up in by corporation. The authority for making bye-laws for this purpose is somewhat tenuous, but it may be spelt out from the provision of section 481 part F and Part L, particularly sub section (i) of part L containing the words necessary for the efficient municipal Government of Delhi. In so far as the building plans submitted to the Corporation made by persons who are not architects under the Architect's Act, 1972 are concerned, we need not say anything as to the power of the Corporation to insist on such to the persons possessing licenses to be issued by the Corporation under the bye-laws framed by the Corporation. In our view, therefore, the authority of the Corporation, if any, is restricted to the licensing and making other related provisions to govern the qualifications and conduct of persons other than the registered architects while submitting building plans to the Corporation. But as will be shown under the second consideration below, the Corporation does not possess any such power after the coming into force of the Architects Act, 1972 in relation to persons who are registered as architects there under.

CONSIDERATION NO.2

Section 502 of the Act is as follows :

"Save as: provided in this Act, nothing contained in this Act shall be constructed as authorising the disregard by the corporation or any municipal authority or any municipal officer or other municipal employees of any law for the time being enforce."

This salutory provision recognises that the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act being a general measure relating to the functioning of the Corporation is not expected to provide for the details of the various related questions with which the Corporation may have to deal for the time being only or in the absence of special law dealing with such matters. The Architects Act, 1972 is a special law dealing with the qualifications to be possessed by persons for being registered as architects and restricting the terms "architect" or "registered architect" to such persons only. Since the possession of a registration certificate under the Architects Act, 1972 regarded by Parliament as sufficient qualification for the practice of architects and since all related questions have been dealt with in respect of architects by the said Act, It became unnecessary for the Corporation to do so thereafter. In view of section 502 of the Act, the provisions referred to above which could be constructed authorising the corporation to regulate the licensing of architects and draughtsman could not be so constructed after coming into force of the Architects Act, 1972.

We accordingly declare that the judgements under appeal by the learned single Judge are not to be understood to mean that the impugned actions of the Corporation including the bye-laws and the resolutions or orders referred to in relief(s) asked for in the writ petitions are quashed for all purposes. It is sufficient for us to declare that none of these provisions will affect in any way the status and practice of persons. including the possession of license and payment of license fee or amounts or security. etc. and the respondents shall be free to act as architects and submit building plans to the Municipal Corporation of Delhi without having to comply with any of these provisions.

Subject to these observations. the appeals are dismissed without any order as to costs.

Sd/-                 Sd/-
B.N. Kirpal        V .S. Despande
Judge                 Chief Justice

Seal High Court of Delhi

IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI
No. C.W.No.547/80

Shri Om Prakash Mittal, through Shri Raghubir Malhotra with Mr. Yash Pal and Mukul Gupta, Advocates

VERSUS

Council of Architecture and ors., through Mr. K.R. Nagaraja, Advocates

Date of Decision : September 17, 1982

CORAM:
The Hon'ble Mr. Justice S.B. WAD

1. Whether Reporters of local papers may be allowed to see the Judgement?

2. To be referred to the Reporter or not? Yes

3. Whether their Lordships wish to see the fair copy of the Judgement? Yes

S.B. Wad, J

In this petition, under Section 226 of the Constitution the petitioner has challenged the order of the Council of Architecture passed on October 9, 1979, refusing the registration to the petitioner as an Architect, under Section 25(b) of the Architect Act, 1972. The relevant portion of the order reads:

"I regret to inform you that on the basis of the documents submitted, and your personal interview, you cannot be registered as an Architect under Section 25(b) of the Architects Act, 1972 as the Council is not satisfied that you were engaged in practice of ex service as an Architect for more than 5 years prior to 27th April, 1974."

The petitioner has also prayed for a declaration that Sections 35 and 37 of the Act violate Article 14 and 19(1) (g) of the Constitution and are, therefore, unconstitutional.

For appreciating the petitioner's grievance, the object and scheme of the Act will have to be noted. The statement of objects and reasons fully explain the reasons for the passing of the Act. The statement reads:

"Since independence and more particularly with the implementation of the Five-Year Plans, the building construction activity in our country has expanded almost on a phenomenal scale. A large variety of buildings, many of extreme complexity and magnitude like multi-storied office buildings, factory buildings residential houses, is being constructed each year. With this increase in the building activity, many unqualified persons calling themselves as architects are undertaking the construction of buildings which are uneconomical and quite frequently are unsafe, thus brining into disrepute the profession of architects. Various organisations, including the Indian Institute of Architects, have repeatedly emphasised the need for statutory regulation to protect the general public from unqualified persons working as architects. With the passing of this legislation, it will be unlawful for any person to designate himself as `architect' unless he has the requisite qualifications and experience and is registered under the Act. The Legislation is generally on the same line as similar Act in other countries."

Section 37 of the Act prescribes that after the expiry of one year from the date/appointed/under sub section (2) of Section 24, no person other than a registered architect or a firm of architect shall use the title and style of architect. The appointed date fixed under the said Section is 27th April, 1974. Since the prescription of the qualifications and experience for the registration of a person as an architect were being prescribed for the first time by the said Act, it was necessary to make a special provision for the registration of persons who were working as architects before that date. Section 24 provides for a Registration Tribunal consisting of 3 persons to examine whether a person is qualified enough to be registered as an architect. The decision was to be taken by the Tribunal after giving the person affected an opportunity of being heard and after calling for relevant records, Register of architects prepared after such examination was described as the first register. It may be mentioned that the Central Government had appointed such Registration Tribunal under the Chairmanship of Justice P.N. Khanna of this Court and `the first register' was prepared. For the administration of the Act and for discharging various functions under the Act, Section 3 of the Act envisages a Council of Architecture. It is a large body of about 50 people with the representation of the profession, Central Government and State Governments.

Section 21 empowers the council to prescribe minimum standards of architectural education. Sections 18 and 19 empower the Council to regulate the courses for the training of architects and to enforce academic standards through the institutions imparting training in architecture. Section 22 empowers the Council to frame regulations to prescribe professional conduct, etiquette and a code of ethics for architects. The Council can remove an architect from the register if an architect is found quality of professional mis-conduct by virtue of power under Section 30 of the Act. As stated above, Section 37 prohibits a person from using the title or to style himself as an architect unless he is registered by the council. Section 35 gives a preference to a registered architect in matter of appointment as an architect under central or State Government or a local body.

Section 25 makes a provision for registration where the applications are made after 27th April, 1974, the appointed date under Section 24(2) of the Act. A person can be registered under Section 25, if the person

1. holds a recognised qualification, or
   
   

2. does not hold such a qualification but being a citizen of India, has been engaged in practice as an architect for a period of not less than 5 years prior to the date appointed under sub section 2 of Section 24, or
   
   

3. possesses such other qualifications as may be prescribed by the Rules."

The decision regarding registration is taken by the Registrar as empowered by Section 26(2) of the Act. Section 26(3) provides for the appeal to the Council against the order of the Registrar. The appeal should be filed within 3 months of the date of rejection of the application by the Registrar.

The petitioner passed the examination conducted by All India Council of Technical Education and was awarded national certificate in Civil Engineering in 1961. In 1967, the got the national diploma in Civil Engineering from the same institute. This diploma is held to be equivalent to Bachelor in Engineering examination. He got this diploma when he was serving as a junior engineer in C.P.W.D. He worked in C.P.W.D. as a Junior Engineer from September 27, 1963 till May 12, 1972. He was enrolled as a member by the Institute of Engineers (MIE) thereafter. In 1973, he was issued a license by the Municipal Corporation of Delhi to practice as an engineer. He was also included in the list of approved architects and values under `Own Your Home' scheme of the Life Insurance Corporation of India. He was permitted by the urban estate office, Faridabad to act as an architect and was registered as such.

On 24-7-1975 the petitioner made an application for registration in Form No.XI prescribed by the Rules. As against the column "Date of commencement of profession/service" the petitioner wrote "Affidavit attached". As against the column "whether practicing independently/as partner or employed", the petitioner wrote "practicing independently, Prof. M/s Mittal & Associates". In the affidavit the petitioner stated that he had been in the architectural profession for the last 15 years and had designed and supervised a number of buildings including residential, commercial and factory buildings. It may be noted that the petitioner did not disclose that he was working as a Junior Engineer in the CPWD from 1963 to 1972. He also did not disclose the particulars or plans of the buildings designed and supervised by him. At the time of the arguments, the counsel for the respondent pointed out that the petitioner did not disclose in his application that he had applied for registration under Section 24 and the Registration Tribunal had rejected his application. For the purpose of this petition we may assume that a fresh application can be made under Section 25(b) even if an application under Section 24 is rejected. On receipt of the application, the Registrar of Council informed the petitioner that he had not mentioned "the actual date of commencement of the profession of architecture." The petitioner replied that he was "engaged in the profession and architecture since July 1, 1961". On the scrutiny of the application, the Registrar rejected the application for registration under Section 25(b) after considering the particulars stated in the application and the other relevant documents filed by the petitioner. This order was passed on 23.12.1976. The order reads:

"The applicant Shri O.P. Mittal does not hold any architectural qualification. He worked as Junior Engineer in CPWD from 27.9.1963 to 12-5-1972 as per statement made in the application filed with the Municipal Corporation of Delhi for licenses No.E-571 vide certified copy of municipal license (receipt No.554057 dated 20.1.73). He, therefore, does not fulfill the condition of 5 years in practice as Architect prior to 27.4.74 under Section 25(b) of the Act. His application, therefore, is rejected."

His appeal against the order of the Registrar was rejected by the Council on October 9, 1979. The relevant portion of the order is quoted above.

The impugned order is challenged by the petitioner on the following grounds: 

1. That the order is not passed by the Council as required by Section 26 of the Act but by the Advisory Committee;
   
   

2. He was denied the proper opportunity of being heard. He was not allowed to file some documents and certain documents filed by him were not considered;
   
   

3. The order was a non speaking order;
   
   

4. The Council misconstrued the provisions of Section 25(b) in as much as it took the view that the five years experience prescribed by the Section must be in private practice and not in Government service. His experience for 9 years in CPWD was over-looked.
   
   

5. Section 37 of the Act was violative of Article 14 & 19 of the Constitution. Restricting the use of the title architect only to certain category of qualified persons as distinguished from other qualified persons has no rational nexus to the objects of the Act;
   
   

6. The right to carry profession (Article 19(1) (g) is denied to him by virtue of the said Section;
   
   

7. Section 35(2) was a discriminatory as it seeks to jeopardise & injuriously restrict the progress of otherwise qualified and competent practitioners of the profession of architectural;
   
   

8. The impugned decision is discriminatory and violates Article 14 in as much as some other persons, similarly situate, have been granted the registration, while the same is refused to the petitioner.
   
   

I will first deal with the challenge to constitutionality of Section 35(2) and Section 37. Section 37(1) states that no person other than a registered architect, or a firm of architects shall use the title or style of architect one year after the appointed date under Sub-section (2) of Section 24. This provision is a necessary consequential provision to mandatory requirement of registration under the Act. The Act and the Regulations prescribe professional qualifications, for registration as an architect. They also lay down the standards of professional experience (of architectural work) required for an architect, where a person does not hold the professional academic qualifications prescribed under the Act. Right to practice a profession is guaranteed by Article 19 (1) (g) of the Constitution. Article 19(6) empowers State to make law relating to the professional or technical qualifications necessary for practicing any profession. Laying down professional qualifications for the profession of architecture as done by the Act and prohibiting persons who do not fulfill the said qualifications from posing themselves as architects, is constitutionally permissible. The restriction, if all is a reasonable restriction. There is no merit in the petitioner's contention that there is no nexus with the object of the Act. The object of the Act, as stated above, is to prevent unqualified persons calling themselves as architects and undertaking the construction of buildings which are uneconomical or unsafe and who bringing the profession of architect into disrepute. The provision is essentially in the interest of general public and it is meant for protecting the public from unqualified persons working as architects. The restriction imposed by Section 37 does not violate Article 14 of the Constitution. Challenge to the validity of Section 35 of the Act is also without a merit. Section 35 gives preference to registered architects in matters of employment in government service and in the service of local authorities. Public works are undertaken by these bodies for the welfare of the people, huge public fund are employed for that purpose. It is in public interest that the funds are properly utilised and substandard and uneconomical constructions are prevented. A qualified architect would naturally have preference over an unqualified person claiming to be an architect. There is no discrimination because by very definition a qualified architect falls in a different class from that of a person who is not qualified. Preference in public employment, is also an added encouragement for a prospective architect for achieving high professional and technical proficiency. Only two cases were cited by the counsel for the petitioner to substantiate the charge of discrimination. They are of Shri Gurcharan Singh and Shri H.H. Dixit.

Gurcharan Singh was carrying on independent practice as an architect. He was working as a senior architectural draftsman in the architectural wing of the C.P.W.D. From 1.1.1971, he was given in selection grade as an architectural assistant. His work was certified by Shri H. Rehman, Chief Architect, Shri O. Muthachen, Engineering Chief, Shri J.M. Binjamin, Chief Architect CPWD and Shri A.N. Banerjee, Secretary Ministry of Works and Housing, New Delhi. His architectural drawings of important and prestigious projects were also seen by the council. Shri Dixit, who holds a decree in Civil Engineering was working as a Civil Engineer in Bisra Stone Lime Company Ltd. Birmitrapur, Orissa. He was working both as an Architect and Civil Engineer in the company. The plans prepared by him and as sanctioned by municipality and town planning authority were produced. He had also produced sixty building plans prepared by him. The plan were examined by the committee and the committee was satisfied that Dixit had sufficient experience of designing major works. As against this, the petitioner did not produce any plans prepared by him and sanctioned by the Municipal authorities. He did not produce any letters engaging him as an architect. He also did not produce the income tax returns. He was specifically directed to produce these documents. Considering the material produced by the petitioner, the council was not satisfied that he had sufficient experience to be registered as an architect. I am satisfied from the record of Shri Gurcharan Singh and Dixit that the decision of the council was based on sufficient objective data. Compared to these two persons the petitioner did not disclose through any record that he possessed experience equal to that of Gurcharan Singh or Dixit. The charge of discrimination is ill conceived and is, therefore, rejected.

The argument of the petitioner is that it is the Council who should take the decision under Section 26 and the advisory committee had no jurisdiction to decide the appeal. The argument has no substance. As pointed out earlier, the Council consists of about 50 members. They come from various States. They also come as representatives of several institutions. Five architects are elected by Indian Institute of Architects from amongst its members. The members of the Council come from different parts of India. It is impossible and impracticable for such a large body to meet for each appeal. The Legislature is aware of this difficulty. Section 10(1) for the Act, therefore, provides that the Council may constitute committees for such general or special purposes as the council deems necessary to carry out its functions under the Act. The appointment of the Advisory Committee was made under Section 10. The decision of the advisory committee is approved by the Council. Even in quasi-judicial matters, it is not unknown to distribute the functions in more than one authority. Under the C.C.A. Rules the disciplinary authority appoints an enquiry officer to carry out the disciplinary enquiry but the final decision is taken by the disciplinary authority. In this case, the advisory committee consisted of eminent experts. Shri B. Kambo, who acted as a Chairman, was a Chief Town Planner and Architect and Adviser to Government of Rajasthan. Major General Harkirat Singh was the nominee of Institution of Engineers of India. Shri B.N. Banerjee was the Chief Architect to the government of West Bengal and Mr. M.H. Siddiqi, was the Chief Architect of the Government of Jammu and Kashmir. The submission of the petitioner is without any merit.

The next submission of the petitioner that he was not given the proper opportunity of being heard, is wrong. The petitioner was directed to appear in person and produce the documents such as the actual plans prepared by him, the letters of the municipal authorities sanctioning such plans, the letters of the owners of the buildings appointing him as an architect and income tax assessment orders. He merely submitted a general list of the works allegedly undertaken by him without furnishing the said documents. He was given oral hearing. It is not a fact that he was prevented from producing any documents. The letter which called upon him to produce the above mentioned documents also gave him liberty to produce any other documents in his possession. It is not the Council but the petitioner who denied to himself the opportunity of presenting sufficient material or arguments in support of his case. The allegation of denial of opportunity is thus false. The petitioner then submits that the council did not properly appreciate the requirement of Section 25(b). According to the petitioner Section 25(b) should be liberally construed so as to include the experience as an engineer also. He submits that every engineer performs architectural functions. In his opinion, the Council erroneously assumed that the experience of five years prescribed by Section 25(b) is an experience in a private practice. The submission of the petitioner is totally misconceived. It is too presumptuous for the petitioner, who was merely a Junior Engineer in C.P.W.D. to imagine that the persons of the eminence who sat in the advisory committee did not understand the meaning or requirement of Section 25(b) of the Act. Some of them are eminent engineers and architects. They know the difference between the professional work done by engineer and by an architect. There is certain amount of finality to the judgement of the high power expert body.

Their judgement as to what constitutes experience of architectural worker must be given high regard. It must be frankly admitted that the courts, which are not trained in the technical discipline of engineering and architecture, cannot claim any technical knowledge superior to the experts in the field. It is well recognised principle of law that the Court shall not substitute its own judgement to that of an expert particularly in the highly technical fields. The scope of enquiry by the Court is limited only to find out whether the technical requirements of law, in arriving at a decision, are followed or not or whether the decision is vitiated by maladies, fraud etc. The petitioner himself suppressed the fact that he was working as a junior engineer in the C.P.W.D. for 9 years. He did not mention it in the proforma application. Can such a petition now turn around and say that the Council did not consider this experience? As a matter of fact the statement of the petitioner that his experience in service is not considered is incorrect. The impugned order clearly states that Council was not satisfied that he was engaged "in practice/service as an architect for more than 5 years prior to 27th April, 1974". The Council has thus considered both his private practice as well as service. But merely to confirm that the Council was not on the wrong track, I permitted the petitioner to enumerate the duties of a junior engineer in C.P.W.D. By way of Annexure P.6 the petitioner has produced the duty chart of the junior engineers, as mentioned in Appendix XVI of the Central Public Works Department. The duty chart shows that the main functions of a junior engineer is to remain at the site throughout in order to see that works are executed according to the specifications, drawings and standards. He arranges for the materials and keeps the government materials in his custody. He records measurements of works and prepares extracts of measurements at the time of preparation of bills, or closing of muster rolls. He submits progress reports of works as required by the superiors. He maintains Register/Accounts such as cement register, curing register etc. He maintains accounts of temporary advances, stock accounts, and impress accounts etc. He maintains the register of inspection of buildings. He marks the attendance and maintains attendance register and muster rolls of the labour. His other duties are to prepare estimates of annual repairs, to submit reports of accidents, to make first aid arrangements in case of accidents, to verify the bills, to detect and report unauthorised occupation or additions or alterations. He keeps the drawings of buildings and services under his charge. He submits progress reports and other returns to the superior officers. He collects engineering data for estimates and prepares rough drawings and site plans connected therewith. He checks up the cost estimates. He helps the preparation and checking of design. He scrutinies the drawings prepared by the architects. The list of duties does not indicate that junior engineer is in any way concerned with the planning and designing of the buildings. He is almost at the lowest rung officer amongst the civil engineers. The Assistant Engineer, Executive Engineer, Supdt. Engineer and Chief Engineer are superior officers in the normal hierarchy of civil engineers in all engineering establishments of the government. It is too much to say that the officer at the longest rung in engineer department, plans and designs the buildings. The duty chart fully justify the decision of the Council that the petitioner was not performing any architectural functions as a junior engineer. Once the period of 9 years as a junior engineer is excluded it is obvious that the period of five years as required by Section 25(b) would not be complete, even if it is assumed that the experience of the petitioner subsequent to 1972 was of the nature of architectural practice. However, the facts are different. The license which the petitioner secured from the M.C.D. is only for practicing as engineer and not as an architect. So is the case with the panel enlistment in L.I.C. Under the "Own Your House" Scheme (OYH) of the LIC, valuation of houses required to be made for the purposes of advancing loan to policy holders. The L.I.C. permits an engineer as well as an architect to furnish such valuation of a building. To work as a valuer of L.I.C., therefore, does not amount to carrying on the profession of an architect. The story as regards the registration with the urban estate office Faridabd, is not much different. In fact, no particulars are provided by the petitioner to judge the experience of architectural work performed by the petitioner by virtue of the said Faridabad registration. With the material produced by the petitioner (or lack or material) the Council was fully justified in taking the decision of not registering the petitioner as an architect.

The decision of the Council is however challenged on the ground that the appellate order is a non-speaking order. It is not correct to say that the order is not a speaking order. The petitioner did not produce any material, although full opportunity was given to him to do so.

The service particulars of the petitioners were not furnished by him in his application. The Registrar discovered them. It is too obvious as fact that a junior engineer in C.P.W.D. does not plan or design any buildings or constructions works. The other certificates of practice produced by the petitioner on their face, represent the practice as an engineer and not as an architect. The experts who sat in advisory committee are experts in the technical field. They are not trained lawyers or Judges. It is too much to expect that they should disclose in the order each of the arguments and to give reply to them point by point. If the decisions of expert bodies, are based on the proper data (evidence) and if the decisions are not coloured by any extraneous considerations and if the decisions show proper application of mind, such decision must be assumed to be reasoned orders. There are no allegations of the nature stated above, vitiating the decision of the council. This submission of the petitioner is also to be rejected.

For the reasons stated above, petition is dismissed; but in the circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs. Rule is discharged.

Sd/-
S.B. Wad
Judge

September 17, 1982

(To be Refer to the Reporter)

IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI
Civil writ petition no. 1348 of 1980

Kaustubha Nand Pandey ................. PETITIONER

through Mr. Amlan Ghosh, Advocates

VERSUS

Council of Architecture etc. ................. RESPONDENTS

through Mr. K.R. Nagaraja, Advocate

Date of Decision : September 17, 1982

CORAM:
The Hon'ble Mr. Justice S.B. WAD

1. Whether Reporters of local papers may be allowed to see the Judgement?
   
   
2. To be referred to the Reporter or not?
   
   
3. Whether their Lordships wish to see the fair copy of the Judgement?

S.B. Wad, J.

1. This writ petition is filed against the order of the Council of Architecture passed on 17th September, 1979 rejecting petitioner's application for registration as an Architect under Section 25(b) of the Architect's Act, 1972.
   
   

2. The grounds for the challenge of the said order and the legal submissions are the same as are made in Civil Write Petition No. 547 of 1980. I have fully dealt with the said submissions in the said writ petition and have rejected the same. This petition was in fact heard along with the said petition.
   
   

3. I will only examine now the submissions on merits made in this petition.
   
   

4. The petitioner was born in 1949. He passed his High School Certificate Examination in 1962. In 1972 he passed B.Sc. Examination. According to the certificate produced by him from R.C. Mehta, Architect and Chartered Engineer, Surveyor and Estate Valuer, New Delhi, the petitioner was working as an Architectural Assistant with the firm from May 1961 to June, 1963. He has annexed the list of works executed by him. The list shows that about twenty construction works were undertaken by him, the total valuation of which runs into several lacs. Thereafter he was working as a Punch Operator at the Computer Centre, Structural Engineering Research Centre till 4.7.1971. From 5.7.1971 to 28.6.1972 he was working as a Programme Assistant, Meerut University. He claims to have continued his practice as an Architect thereafter.
   
   

5. It may be seen that the petitioner does not hold any academic qualification as an Architect. He is not even a Civil Engineer as in the other case. He passed his Matriculation Examination in 1962 but claims that from 1961 to 1963 he was working as an Architect and had done works worth rupees several lacs. This means that between his age of twelve and fifteen he was practicing as an Architect. After the arguments were over the petitioner had filed an affidavit to state that according to his Janampatrika he was born on 28th June, 1946 and not in 1949 as is recorded in the School records. The petitioner must be some thing of a genius to do construction works worth lacs of rupees at the age of about 15. He has worked as a Computer Operator and as a Programme Assistant which has nothing to do with the Architectural profession. Even assuming that he was doing some architectural work after 1972 he did not complete the five years experience on 27.4.1974 as required by Section 25(b) of the Act. Before the Advisory Council he did not produce any drawings of the works done by him. The Council of Architectures was fully justified on the basis of the information and the documents supplied by the petitioner to come to a conclusion that he did not deserve to be registered as an Architect.
   
   

6. The petition is dismissed. In the circumstances of the case I do not pass any orders as to costs.

Rules is discharged.

Sd/-
S.B. Wad
Judge

September 17, 1982

IN THE GUAHATI HIGH COURT

(The High Court of Assam, Nagaland, Meghalaya, Manipur, Tripura, Mizoram & Arunachal Pradesh)

BEFORE

The Hon'ble Chief Justice Mr. Brijesh Kumar
The Hon'ble Mr. Justice P.G. Agarwal

Date : 3-7-19999

WRIT APPEAL NO.114 OF 1996

1. Association of Architects, Assam,
   represented by its General Secretary -
   Shri Sriprakash Sandilya,
   Maniram Dewan Path,
   Chandmari, Guwahati - 21.
   (Near designer building)
   


2. The State of Assam
   


3. The Secretary to the Govt. of Assam
   Public Works Department, Dispur
   


4. The Chief Engineer,
   Public Works Department,
   Building Division, Assam,
   Guwahati -3.
   
5. The Director of Technical Education,
   Assam, Kahilipara, Guwahati - 19.
   
6. Girls' Polytechnic, Guwahati,
   represented by its Principal,
   Guwahati - 21.
   

2. We have heard the learned counsel Shri B.K. Das for the appellants and the learned counsel appearing for the respondents.
   


3. Assam which is registered under the Societies Registration Act. It is averred that its members are qualified and registered Architects under the provisions of the Architects Act, 1972. Some of them are private professionals and others are employed including in the P.W.D., Assam. The present appellants were appointed by different orders passed by the Chief Engineer, P.W.D. as Architectural Draftsman. Order dated January 20, 1988 was issued by the Government of Assam saying that in the interest of public service the Governor of Assam was pleased to redesignate the post of Architectural Draftsman, P.W.D. as Junior Architect with immediate effect. This redesignation has been objected to by the Association of Architects, Assam on the ground that the appellants have undergone three years' Diploma course in Architectural Assistantship from the Girls' Polytechnic which is neither recognised by the Central Government nor the Council of Architecture. They are also not registered as Architect as provided under Section 37 of the Architects Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as the ?Act, 1972?). Therefore, designation of Architects or Junior Architect cannot be bestowed upon them. It violates the provisions of the Act, 1972. It was also the case of the petitioner association that the appellants were being considered for promotion to the post of Assistant Architect in the Public Works Department from the post of Junior Architect in the similar manner as provided for the Diploma holder Junior Engineers in the P.W.D. who are promoted to the post of Assistant Engineer and so on. The case of the petitioner further is that under the Service Rules in the P.W.D there is no post of Junior Architect. Hence the process of consideration of promotion of the appellants as Assistant Architect was bad in law and prayer was made that the Government may be restrained from proceeding further in the matter. Various provisions of the Act, 1972 have been placed before us.
   


4. Clause (a) of Section 2 of the Act, 1972 defines the word "architect" to mean a person whose name is entered in the register. Section 14 of the Act, 1972 provides for recognition of qualifications granted by the authorities and it provides that qualifications included in the schedule or notified under Section 15 shall be recognised qualifications for the purpose of the Act. As indicated earlier, according to the petitioner-respondent, three years' diploma in Architectural Assistantship given by the Girls' Polytechnic, Assam is not a recognised qualification in terms of Section 14. A reference has also been made to Section 21 of the Act, 1972 which provides that the Council may prescribe the minimum standard of architectural education required for granting recognised qualifications by colleges or institutions in India. Section 22 of the Act, 1972 provides for regulation of professional conduct of the Architects by the Council of Architecture. Section 23 provides for preparation and maintenance of register of architects. Section 25 provides for qualification for entering in the register and says that a person shall be entitled on payment of prescribed fee for his name to be entered in the register if he carries on his profession of architect in India and holds a recognised qualification, or in case he does not hold such a qualification but being an Indian citizen, has been engaged in practice as an architect for a period of not less than five years prior to the date appointed under sub-section (2) of Section 24. Section 35 provides for some preference to be given to the registered architects in the matter of employments in the Government and local bodies and institutions. The relevant provisions contained in Section 37 which prohibits the use of title of " architects" reads as under
                            "37. Prohibition against use of title - (1) After the expiry of one year from the date    appointed under sub-section (2) of section 24, no person other than a registered architect, or a firm of             architects shall use the title and style of architect:
   
   Provided that the provisions of this section shall not apply to -
   
   (a)     practice of the profession of an architect by a person designated as a landscape architect' or 'naval architect'
   
   (b)    a person who, carrying on the profession of an architect in any country outside India, undertakes the function as a consultant or designer in India for a specific project with the prior permission of the Central Government.
   
   Explanation -For the purposes of clause (a) -
   
   (i)    'landscape architect' means a person who deals with the design of open spaces relating to plants, trees and landscape;
   
   (ii)    'Naval architect' means an architect who deals with design and construction of ships.
   
   (2)    If any person contravenes the provisions of sub-section(1), he shall be punishable on first conviction with fine - which may extend to five hundred rupees and on any subsequent conviction with imprisonment which may extend to six months or with fine not exceeding one thousand rupees or with both."
   
   


5. The learned Single Judge by means of the impugned judgment disposed of the writ petition holding that the Government cannot use the title of Architect in respect of persons who are not qualified and registered under the Act. It was further provided that promotion may be given to those persons in due course, but not with the name and style of Architects and that the service condition of the appellants may not be changed.
   


6. Learned counsel for the appellants has vehemently urged that the provisions contained in the Architects Act, 1972 would not be applicable in the case of those who are in the Government employment. There is no denial of the fact that the names of the appellants are not registered in the register of Architects as provided under sections 24 and 25 of the Act. There is also no denial of the fact that the qualifications as held by the appellants, namely, three years diploma course from the Girls' Polytechnic, Assam, is not recognised qualification under Section 14 of the Act having not included in the schedule. Section 14 of the Act reads as follows : " 14. Recognition of qualifications granted by authorities in India. (1) The qualifications included in the Schedule or notified under section 15 shall be recognised qualifications for the purpose of this Act.
   
   (2)      Any authority in India which grants an architectural qualification not included in the Schedule may apply to the Central Government to have such qualification recognised, and the Central Government, after consultation with the Council, may, by notification in the official Gazette, amend the Schedule so as to include such qualification therein, and any such notification may also direct that an entry shall be made in the Schedule against such architectural qualification declaring that it shall be a recognised qualification only when granted after a specified date:
   
   Provided that until the first Council is constituted, the Central Government shall, before issuing any notification as aforesaid, consult an expert committee consisting of three members to be appointed by the Central Government by notification in the official Gazette."
   


7. Section 15 provides for recognition of qualification granted by any university or other institution in any country outside India. It appears that the Girls' Polytechnic granting three years' diploma to the appellants has not applied to the Central Government for its inclusion in the schedule. In any case, it is nobody's case that it finds place in the schedule. According to the definition of the word "architect" it means a person whose name is entered in the register. Register of architects is maintained under Sections 23 and 24 of the Act. Thus from the provisions indicated above, it is quite clear that the qualification which is held by the appellants is not recognised qualification in terms of Section 14 of the Act and the appellants are also not entered in the register of architects. On behalf of the appellants, however, it is indicated that the qualification held by the appellants is recognised by the State Council of Technical Education and the Girls' Polytechnic is recognised by All India Council For Technical Education. It may be correct, but the question is whether it meets the requirement of the provisions of Architects Act, or not. In case it does not meet the requirement of the provisions of the Act, one may not be entitled to use the title of designation of 'Architect'. A clear prohibition is also contained under section 37 of the Act.
   


8. We may now consider the submission made on behalf of the appellants that the Architects Act, 1972 would not be applicable to the architects working in the Government Department. In this connection learned counsel has drawn our attention to the statement of objects and reasons of the Architects Act, 1972. According to the said statement, since the building activity had increased manifold all around, namely, multi-storeyed office building, factory building, residential houses, etc., minimum qualified persons calling themselves as Architects have been undertaking the construction of building which are uneconomical and not safe. Thus with a view to protect the general public from unqualified persons working as Architects a statutory regulation would be necessary. The statement of objects and reasons also says that with the passing of the legislation it would be unlawful for any person to designate himself as 'architect' unless he has the requisite qualification and is registered under the Act. Thereafter the main features of the Bill are indicated in the statement of objects and reasons. The feature at serial No.4 has been particularly placed before us which stipulates that after expiry of two years from the date of the Act coming into force, a registered architect shall get preference for appointment as an architect under the Central or State Government or any other local body. From this feature it is tried to be shown that there is clear bifurcation of those carrying on private profession and those who may be provided Government employment. Those who get Government employment, they would be governed by the conditions of service of the Government department and not by the provisions of the Act, whereas the private professionals whose conduct is sought to be chanalised and mal practices are sought to be checked, they will be governed by the provisions of the Act. To lay a further emphasis on this aspect of the matter learned counsel for the appellants has urged that so far Government employees are concerned, their conduct is controlled and governed by the rules of the Government service. In case they commit any gross negligence or any other misconduct they can well be dealt with under the Rules applicable to the Government employees, but private professionals would not be controlled by any provisions except as contained in the architects act, 1972. It is thus submitted that the purpose of enacting the Architects Act, 1972 was only to have control over the private professionals.
   


9. Learned counsel for the appellants has also drawn our attention to section 23 of the Act which provides for preparation and maintenance of register of architects. One of the information prescribed to be recorded in the register is indicated in clause (d) of sub-section (3) is the "professional address?. It provides as follows:
   
   "(3)      The register shall include the following particulars, namely:-
   
              (a)     .................
   
             (b)     .................
   
             (c)     .................
   
             (d)     his professional address; and .................."
   
   Form 2 as prescribed under the Rules requiring similar information has also been pressed into service to infer that the register is maintained only for the professionals. It may be indicated that clause (e) of sub-section (3) of Section 23 further provides that such further particulars are also to be mentioned as prescribed by the rules. It is difficult to infer from the above noted provisions that the provisions of the Act apply only to the private professionals.
   


10. Learned counsel for the appellants has cited before us a decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court reported in AIR 1958 SC 353 (Workmen of Dimakuchi Tea Estate vs. Management of Dimakuchi Tea Estate) where it has held that in case of doubt about the meaning of a word of a statute it is to be understood in the sense in which they best harmonise with the subject of the enactment and the object which the Legislature had in view. The meaning need not be strictly in accordance with the grammatical or etymological propriety of language nor its popular use, but the object which is sought to be attained has to be kept in mind. On the basis of this decision it is submitted that the objects of enacting Architects Act, 1972 was to protect the general public from unqualified persons working as architects. Such unqualified persons work in a manner which is unsafe and uneconomical and they also bring the profession of architect to disrepute. With this end in view the enactment was made. The submission is that the Government does not need any such protection. It is not included in the general public. Hence the provisions of the Act are to be interpreted in the manner that they serve the object and purpose of the Act for which it is enacted rather than to have in its sweep the Government employees also who remain under the control of the Government and are bound by the Government rules and are answerable to it.
    


11. On behalf of the respondents reliance has been placed upon a decision reported in AIR 1983 Delhi 223 (Om Prakash Mittal v. Council of Architecture and others) in which the validity of the provisions of the Architects Act including Section 37 has been upheld. We hardly find that this decision is of any help on the point involved in the present case. The vires of the Act is not under challenge.
    


12. It is no doubt that the argument as advanced on behalf of the appellants is attractive, but it hardly appeals us. It is true, looking to the sudden spurt in the activity of building constructed for factories, industries, housing colonies, office complexes, etc. it was considered that the profession of architecture must be regulated. Only those who have proper education and training and are qualified to work as such may alone be permitted to work as architects. It is a legislation especially dealing with the architects. Meaning of the word 'architect' has been statutorily provided under clause (a) of Section 2 where it has been provided that it means one whose name is entered in the register. A register of architects is prepared and maintained as indicated earlier under the provisions of Sections 23 and 24 of the Act. Section 25 provides that a person shall be entitled to be entered in the register who holds a recognised qualification.so far recognised qualification is concerned, it is one which is included in the Schedule under Section 14 of the Act. Any authority which grants an architectural qualification has a right to apply to the Central Government to have such qualification recognised. The Central Government in turn after consulting the Council of Architecture may by a notification in the official gazette, recognise the qualification and include the same by amending the schedule including the qualification. The authority who imparts architectural education has to maintain certain standard in the educational training failing which the recognition is liable to be withdrawn. Therefore, such institutions have to maintain the standards of examination and provide staff, equipment training and other facilities so that the candidates undergo courses of study and examination and acquire proficiency up to the standard as prescribed by Section 20 of the Act. Section 21 of the Act provides that the Council of Architecture may prescribe the minimum standards of architectural education. Professional conduct is also subject to the regulations framed by the Council. The Council of Architecture, under Section 30 of the Act, is empowered to punish an architect if found guilty of misconduct, may suspend him from practice as an architect or remove his name from the register. Conduct of an architect is effectively controlled by Section 30. As a Government servant one may be punished under the Government rules, but still he may practise the profession of architecture. But check is placed by Section 30 under which the name of an architect is even liable to be removed from the register disentitling him to practise. Therefore, the argument that being in Government service an architect is accountable to his employer according to the rules does not hold good since mere punishment as a Government employee may not be enough to debar him from practising as an architect which is only controlled under Sections 22, 29 and 30 of the Act. The purpose of the Act, therefore, is not only to protect the individuals from unqualified or underqualified persons professing themselves to be Architects but also to regulate the standard of professional education so that they must attain the minimum proficiency and standards required for working as Architects. The standards of professional education set as well as the quality of the institutes imparting education in architecture as well as standards of examination as provided under sections 18 to 21 are necessary to achieve desired standards of an Architect which is necessarily required for all alike - may be private profession or in Government employment. In this view of the matter, prohibition as contained under Section 37 of the Act against use of title and style of Architect except by a registered Architect fulfils the reasons and objects for which the Act is enacted.
    


13. Three years' diploma course in Architectural Assistantship held by the appellants may be recognised by All India Council for Technical Education and the State Council of Technical Education which may be good enough to get them some employment, but not as an Architect unless it is recognised by Council of Architecture in terms of Section 14 of the Act. It is not known as to whether the authorities concerned have ever applied to the Central Government for recognition of diploma in Architectural Assistantship under section 14 of the Act or not. It is also not even the case of the appellants that the standards of the three years diploma course of Girl's Polytechnic conforms to the standards of professional education as laid down by the Council of Architecture under the Act. Under the provisions of the Act only those who have recognised qualification would be entitled for being entered in the register of architect and the "architect" would mean one who is entered in the register of architects. In sequence of things prohibition is contained in Section 37 of the Act that no person other than a registered architect is entitled to use the title and style of architect.
    


14. We do not think it is possible to draw any distinction, as vehemently canvassed before us, between the architects carrying on their private profession as such and the architects who may be in the employment of the Government or in the employment of any other statutory body or local authority or for that purpose any other establishment. The proficiency as required of one carrying on the job of architect is provided, controlled and maintained by the provisions of the Act. It would be difficult to equate three years' diploma course of Architectural Assistantship with the degree course of Architecture imparted according to the standards set under the Act. The same standard of efficiency is required, may be the building activities are carried on by the State or by private individual. In these circumstances the prohibition as contained in Section 37 of the Act cannot be confined only to the private professionals.
    


15. It may also be pointed out here that proviso to Section 37 indicates as to which case Section 37 would not be applicable. It would not apply in case of a "landscape architect" and "naval architect" who deal in design of open space relating to plants and trees, etc. and in designing construction of ship respectively. Section 37 will also not apply to one who carries on profession outside India but has undertaken any specific project in India. Apart from the categories as indicated above, no other exception to the applicability of Section 37 has been provided much less on the ground that one is engaged in private profession or in Government employment.
    


16. The appellants were appointed as Architectural Draftsman. Their designation was sought to be changed later on after they had joined the employment. In our view, the learned Single Judge committed no error in holding that change in the designation describing the appellants as Junior Architects was hit by Section 37 of the of the Act. We also feel that the learned Single Judge has rightly provided that while reverting back to the designation of the appellants to 'Architectural Draftsman' would not in any manner affect their chances of promotion as may be provided under the conditions of their services.
    


17. In view of the discussions held above, we hardly find any good reason to interfere with the order passed by the learned Single Judge. The appeal has no merit and it is accordingly dismissed.
    
    No order as to costs.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
APPELLATE SIDE

Order passed by the High Court in the case of :

                 IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD

                                Special Civil Application No. 1111 of 1999

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY AT GOA
WRIT PETITION NO. 331 OF 2002

The Executive Students Council, an elected boddy of representatives of the students of the College of Architecture, Campal, Goa, through its Chairman, Shri Jerry Cherian, resident of Vasco da Gama. Shri Rohit Nadkarni, General Secretary, r/o Bicholim. Shri Anthony Menezes, Cultural Secretary, r/o Vasco da Gama. Shri Suraj Gaonkar, Magazine Secretary, r/o Panaji. Shri Swapnil Sawant, University Representative, r/o Sanquelim. Shri Rehman Neroo, Sports Secretary, r/o Panjim. Shri Pallavi Ghate, NASA Secretary, r/o Ponda. and the Class Representatives, namely Shri Keegan Fernandes, r/o St. Cruz, Ilhas Goa, Shri Reagan George, r/o Margao Shri Swapnil Sawant, r/o Sanquelim. Shri Sumedh Naik, r/o Pernem Shri Rajnish Vatsa, r/o Taleigao.       Versus			............... Petitioners
Government of Goa through its Chief Secretary, Secretariat, Panaji Directorate of Technical Education through its Director, Porvorim The Prinicipal, Goa College of Architecture, Campal, Panaji The Council of Architecture through its President, India Habitat Centre, Core 6A, 1st Floor, Lodhi Road, New Delhi All India Council for Technical Education through its Chairman, New Delhi The Goa University through its Vice Chancellor, Bambolim, Goa			............... Respondents
Mr. Valmiki Menezes, Advocate for the Petitioners.
Mr. A.N.S. Nadkarni, Advocate General with Mr. P.A. Kamat, Addl. Govt. Advocate for the Respondents 1 to 3.
Mr. V.P. Thali, Senior Central Govt. Standing Counsel for the Respondents 4 and 5.
Mrs. A.A. Agni, Advocate for the Respondent No.6
			Coram : T.K. Chandrashekhara Das & P.V. Kakade, JJ.          Date : 4th October, 2000

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
APPELLATE SIDE
WRIT PETITION NO. 3916 OF 2001

.................. Petitioner

........ Respondents

Coram :

          If in any subsequent year AICTE fails to communicate to the State Government the intake capacity of colleges for that year, the State Government shall proceed on the basis of the intake capacity as determined for the previous year.

          So far as the current Academic Year is concerned, viz., 2001-2002, we direct the Petitioner-Council to communicate to the State of Maharashtra, within three days from the date of receipt of this order, the intake capacity of different colleges as determined by it. The Advocate General states that the State Government will act in accordance with such determination, in so far as the admissions for the Academic Year 2001-2002 are concerned.After the AICTE communicates to the State Government, the statement as regards the intake capacity of various colleges, the State of Maharashtra will commence the admission process.

          Parties to act on a copy of this order duly authenticated by the Sheristedar of this Court.

IN THE COURT OF CHIEF METROPOLITAN MAGISTRATE
TIS HAZARI AT DELHI

Case No. 39/1 of 1996

In the matter of

..................................... COMPLAINANT

       Vs

..................................... ACCUSED

COMPLAINT UNDER SECTIONS 419, 465, 468 & 471 OF IPC

AND UNDER SECTIONS 35, 36 & 37 OF
THE ARCHITECTS ACT, 1972

NOTICE

I, Rakesh Garg MM, Delhi do hereby serve upon you R.R. Nagpal S/o Late Shri Dwarka Dass Nagpal as follows :

It is alleged against you that on the complaint of Shri B.R. Chopra dt. 24/8/95 that you were not the member of Council of Architecture but inspite of the same you were practicing as an Architect. Also your name has also not been registered/mentioned in the Council of Architecture. Inspite of your name not being registered in the Council of Architecture, you used the word Architect alongwith your name in the courts, in the reports/inspection reports filed by you in various courts and thereby committed an offence punishable under Section 36 Indian Architect Act, 1972.

You have also used the name plate/sign board and have used the word Architect alongwith your name and thereby committed an offence punishable under Sec. 36 Indian Architect Act and within the cognizence of this court.

Show cause as to why you should not be tried by this court on the above offence.

Sd/-
MM/Delhi
19/5/1999

Notice read over and explained to accused who is further questioned as under:

Q. : Do you plead guilty or have you any defence to make ?

Ans : I plead guilty

R.O. & A.C.Sd/-
MM/Delhi
19/5/99

Pr : Counsel for the complainant.

      Accused on bail with counsel.

      Notice under Section 36 Indian Architect Act, 1972 framed against the accused to which he pleaded guilty. I accept the plea of guilt as the same is voluntarily, without any coercion or undue influence. Accused is convicted for offence under Section 36 Indian Architect Act, 1972.

      Heard on sentence. Accused is directed to pay a fine of Rs.1000/- in default SI for three months. Fine of Rs.1000/- paid by accused. File be consigned to Record Room.

      ANNOUNCED IN THE OPEN COURT:

      19/5/99

Sd/-
(Rakesh Garg)
Metropolitan Magistrate
Delhi

IN THE COURT OF N.C. NIRJA BHATIA : CIVIL JUDGE, DELHI

SUIT NO. 414/89

..................................... PLAINTIFF

       Vs

..................................... DEFENDENT

SUIT FOR DECLARATION & INJUNCTION

JUDGEMENT

ISSUES :

1. Whether the suit of the pltf. is not maintainable as per provisions of S.R.C. and Architects Act, 1972 ? OPD
   


2. Whether the pltf. is entitled to the relief claimed ? OPP.
   


3. Relief.

ISSUE NO 1

      Issue No.1 was treated as preliminary issue and was disposed off by the orders of Lt. Sh. Jai Prakash Narain, the then Sub Judge, First Class, Delhi on 11/11/93. In view of the disposal of this issue, issue is now not taken up.

ISSUE NO 2 & 3

      Onus of proving this issue was upon the pltf. To discharge the bonus, pltf. brought into witness box, PW1 Sh. M.P. Jain, Engineer from Municipal Committee, Bhiwani, PW2 Sh. Subhash Sindhwani, Clerk from Municipal council, Haryana, PW3 Sh. S.K. Jain, Architect, PW4 Sh. K.K. Jain, Executive Officer, Municipal Council, Jagadhari, Haryana, PW5 Sh. Rajinder Singh, Clerk, Municipal Council, Bhiwani. He deposed Himself as PW6.

      The deft. in rebuttal brought only Sh. Vinod Kumar, Registrar for deft. as DW1.

      The witnesses supported the documents filed on record by the plft. At the first instance, it may be appropriate that the perusal of evidence produced by the parties is started from the certificate issued by Sh. S.K. Jain, PW3 dtd. 30/12, Exhibited as PW3/A. The said certificate reads "To whom so ever it may concern, Certified that Sh. Suresh Pal Jain S/o Sh. Tara Chand Jain is my cousin brother. He has stayed with me in my house from 18/05/68 to 30/08/72." It further reads that "In this period he worked with me as a part time trainee in Draftsman Civil. He also assisted me in supervision of building, detailing for estimate and making drawings, etc. During this period his work and conduct found satisfactory."

      I would like to take a pause here and scrutinise this piece of evidence again. It is pertinent to mention that nowhere Sh. S.K. Jain, Architect certifies that pltf. was working with him as an Architect.

      The word 'Architect' gains imminense importance in view of these statements made by deft. in the written statement to the effect that the work in the Architecture and the job of an Architect is a cumulative job requiring multi-dimensional approach to the subjects concerning mankind. The present certificate clearly mentions that the pltf. was working with Sh. S.K. Jain as a part-time Trainee in Draftsman (Civil). It nowhere specifies that his experience even if stretched from 18/05/68 to 30/08/72 during the stay with Sh. S.K. Jain was in the capacity of an Architect touching the various aspects of Architecture and imparting comprehensive knowledge of the subject and further showing the approach of pltf. towards all the dimension enumerated above. The other documents/certificates place on record by the pltf. which are not disputed are of the period after 1972. If the period of 1972 is calculated up to the cut-out date i.e. 27/04/1974 it nowhere reaches to the experience of five years as set-out as an eligibility condition for the grant of registration. The certificates Ex. PW2/A issued by the Administrator as bearing a date of 1985. This certificate is based on Ex. PW3/A and hence cannot be placed over and above Ex. PW3/A and hence cannot be given more value. The other certificates such as Ex.PW4/1, Ex. PW4/2 are also belonging to the period after the year 1972 and hence taken into considerated does not help pltf. fulfilling the condition of five years experience.

      The Pltf. has further placed on record his matriculation examination certificate of his application for registration alongwith another certificate dtd. 17/8/78, same are exhibited by him as PW6/D1, Ex. PW6/1 and PW6/2. Again Ex. PW6/2 certifies that pltf. has been working as Draftsman (Civil) since 10/05/74 with one R.C. Aggarwal & Associates. This document is also in league with other certificates and also does not give any value to the experience as Architect of pltf. for the period prior to 1972. Pltf. has exhibited the order dtd. 30/05/85 issued by council of Architect which specifies that claim of pltf. cannot be allowed as at the time of pltf.'s allegedly started working as Architect was in the year 1968 and at that time pltf. was merely 16 years of age and on the basis of documents the contention of the pltf. that he was looking after the office of Hissar and Rohtak cannot be upheld and hence claim for registration was declined.

      At this stage, before I take-up the other documents placed on record by the pltf., I propose to deal with the counter-evidence placed on record by the defts. the registrar of the deft. who appeared as DW1 completely supported the claim of the deft. and rebuted that of pltf. It was categorically averred by the said witness in the sequence of events that the claim of the pltf. was admittedly taken-up for consideration on his application U/s. 25 (b). It was duly considered and was rejected. The appeal against the order was filed and was placed before the Advisory Committee consisting of various reputed persons from the field of Architecture, the said report is exhibited as DW1/3. It would be appropriate that few instances concerning the claim of the pltf. are reproduced. Under Item No.7 on page 6 resolution no. 136 specifies that appeals of the candidates such like pltf. in totality 71 appellants were taken-up for consideration. The names of persons whose appeals were not accepted are given on page 3 of Appendix C wherein the report of Advisory Committee is given. It says that personal hearing was imparted to 42 appellants who appeared out of 74 appeals, the remaining persons did not appear though the opportunity was given, however, pltf. appeared before the Advisory Committee and was granted a personal hearing. Clause 4, 6 clearly mentions the intention of the Committee and the objects while dealing with such persons wherein it says, "The Committee strongly feels on considering the appeals either in person or in absentia that many of the appellants being fully aware of the prescribed conditions for registration under the Architecture Act, 1972 are trying to seek registration somehow or other". The Committee, therefore, recommends that administration are in the initial stages itself clarify to the applicants on their eligibility or otherwise. The Committee further discussed the scope of Section 25 (b) in detail in Point 5 at page 2 in its report. It is pertinent that the finding on page 3 point 5.1 be produced which says, "On a careful reading of this provision, the committee came to the conclusion that the appellants should prove to the satisfaction of the Council that they have been engaged in practice as an Architect for a period of not less than five years prior to 27/04/74. Point 5.2, 5.3, 5.4 further defined the terms as Architect and phrase practising as an Architect. It would be interesting to note the finding on point 5.6 which says, "If a person is practising as a Draftsman, he is merely assisting the Architect in carrying-out his instructions and translating his ideas into drawings. This does not mean that a person is practising as an architect". Further annexure of this report at issue no. 31 details the case of the pltf. which says that "Sh. S.P. Jain of Bhiwani (Haryana) appeared before the Committee on Friday, the 17th February, 1989 in connection with his appeal against the decision of the Registrar of the Council for registration of his name under the Architects Act, 1972. The Committee noted that he obtained the Civil Draftsman Certificate in 1972 from Industrial Training Institute, Rohtak and also noted his claim that the was working on part-time basis with his counsin, Sh. S.K. Jain when he was studying for the Civil Draftsman Certificate Course. Shri Jain also made a plea before the committee for relaxation of the prescribed conditions for registration and taking into consideration his practice after 1972 to register him. The Committee, however, made clear to Sh. Jain that no relaxation is permissible."

      In totality, the perusal of report shows no infirmity whatsoever alleged by the pltf. It is patently clear from the perusal that the case of plft. was duly considered at all the stages by the appropriate, concerned authorities. The details were discussed and in view of the objects and intentions of the Architecture Act and in furtherance of the guidelines required for the provision enumerated above it was found that the case of pltf. was not covered under the definition of Architect as he was looking after the field of Draftsman (Civil). It is also clear that the pltf. himself was aware of such fact and asked for the relaxation which was declined.

      On the basis of this, the pltf. has taken the other Argument to the fact that his case was at par with some other persons namely M. Kumar, K.K. Jaitley, S. Ram Kakkar and Sh. Gulzaar Singh. It is stated by the pltf. that though his case was at par in view of the facts & circumstances of the other?s case he was discriminated upon and his registration was not considered wherein the other above named persons were registered by the defts. The reports concerning these persons are exhibited by the pltf. as Ex. PW6/5, Ex. PW6/6, Ex. PW6/7, and Ex. PW6/8. At the out set in the evidence given on oath by the deft., deft. denied that these orders were passed by the deft. It is stated by the Registrar DW1 that these are the orders of appellate authorities U/s. 24 Clause 4. It is stated by the deft. that the deft. has no jurisdiction with respect to these cases as they are dealt directly by the Govt. of India, Ministry of Education and Social Welfare and Department of Education. This contention was neither denied nor disputed by the pltf. It remains to be admitted. Apparently Ex. PW6/7 clearly shows that these are the appeals considered by the Govt. of India and not by the deft. in isolation. Pltf. did not bring any argument in support of the contentions that these orders were passed by the deft. The pltf. also did not bring any argument to the effect that he also approached or exhausted the remedy exhausted by the persons above named. Apparently, after the orders of the deft., pltf. came to the court for the grant of declaration without exhausting this remedy.

The appreciation of the documents admitted by the pltf. as PW5 to PW8 and the reading there of also shows that the certificates filed by the concerned persons were with respect to their experience in the field of Architecture and not in the field of Draftsman. Two of the persons above named were holding more than 8-10 years of experience. In view of these facts, the contention of the pltf. that he has been discriminated upon is also meritless. Heard, at this stage, I propose to take-up the objection furthered by the deft. that has held by the Hon. Justice, Sh. S.P. Wad in his orders dtd. 17/09/82 corraborated again by the orders dtd. 17/09/1982 on the same issue, it is held by Hon. Justice Sh. S.P. Wad that the courts which are not trained in the technical discipline of engineering and Architecture cannot claim any technical knowledge to the experts in the field. It is well recognised priniciples of law that the court shall not substitute its own Judgement to that of an expert particularly in highly technical fields. Scope of enquiry by the court is limited only to find-out whether the technical requirements of law in arriving at a decision are followed or not or whether the decision is vitiated by malafide, fraud, etc. I am in full confirmity and respectfully accept the opinion of Justice Sh. S.P. Wad. It is a well settled principal of law upheld by various courts of law that the pronouncements of the authorities having due diligence and knowledge shall not be disturbed unless it smacks of malafide or fraud, etc. The perusal of the above discussion leaves me with no doubt that the procedure was completely followed in its intent and sole at every stage by the deft. The pltf. also has not alleged any fraud. No malafide is also alleged by the pltf. The only contention raised by the pltf. were with respect to the declining, an opportunity and not following the principles of natural justice, arbitrariness on behalf of the deft. and discrimination which are properly met-out in the detailed discussions above. I see no ground to disturb the findings of the Advisory Committee. In view of this discussion, I am of the opinion that no wrong is committed and hence the issue sets at rest in favour of the deft. and agst. the pltf. In view of this observation, pltf. is not entitled to any relief, as prayed. The suit of the pltf. is dismissed with no orders as to costs.

Decree sheet be prepared accordingly.

Ele be consigned to Record Room after completing necessary formalities.

ANNOUNCED IN THE OPEN COURT ON 18/01/2001.

Sd/-
(Nirja Bhatia)
Civil Judge, Delhi

IN THE COURT OF VI-TH JOINT CIVIL JUDGE JUNIOR DIVISION
PUNE AT PUNE
(BEFORE SHRI D.K. MULLASAHEB)
REGULAR CIVIL SUIT NO.1432/99
EXH. NO. 38

..................................... Plaintiff

       Vs

1. Council of Architecture,
   India Habitate Centre,
   Core 6-A, 1st Floor, Lodhi Road,
   New Delhi
   Pin-110003
   Through it's Admn. Officer
   K. Gopalkrishna Bhat
   


2. Mr. Sudhir Diwan,
   Age - Adult, occ - Architect,
   R/o - 4, Masion Beleverdre
   107, Queens Rd. (Next to IT office)
   New Marine Lines
   Bombay-400020
   

..................................... Defendents

(Summons to be served by Reg. A.D. Post)

Shri S.M. Kelkar advocate for plaintiff

Shri B.R. Phatak advocate for defendant no.1

Suit proceeded without W.S. against defendant no.2

SUIT FOR DECLARATION &
MANDATORY INJUNCTION

JUDGEMENT

(Delivered on 20.10.2000)